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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating to,
oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from December 1, 2017, through No-
vember 30, 2018. The cases examined include decisions of state and fed-
eral courts in the state of Texas and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.1
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING2
A. CONOCOPHILLIPS CO. V. KOOPMANN (RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES)
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann3 held that the rule against perpetu-
ities is generally not applicable in oil and gas conveyances if the termina-
tion of the prior estate is certain to occur and the next taker is
ascertainable.4 The case also construed part of the division order statute,
and held that the statute did not bar a contractual claim for royalties and
interest under the oil and gas lease.5 Under a deed dated December 27,
1996, Grantor reserved a fifteen-year term non-participating royalty in-
terest (NPRI) which could be extended “as long thereafter as there is
production in paying or commercial quantities” under an oil and gas
lease.6 The deed also provided:
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. The facts in the cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles.
2. Other title and conveyancing cases in the reporting period include: Hahn v. Gips,
No. 13-16-00336-CV, 2018 WL 771908 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 8, 2018, pet.
denied) (mot. for reh’g filed Apr. 10, 2019) (mem. op.) (partition deeds); Haywood WI
Units, Ltd. v. B&S Dunagan Inv., Ltd., No. 13-15-00454-CV, 2017 WL 6379737 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 14, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (royalty deed); Bupp v.
Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 280408 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 3, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (reservations in conveyances); Fort Worth 4th St. Partners, L.P. v.
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 882 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2018) (covenants running with surface
estate); XTO Energy, Inc. v. EOG Res., Inc., 554 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. filed) (foreclosure on equitable mineral interest); Neuhoff v. Piranha Partners,
No. 07-16-00136-CV, 2018 WL 2223132 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 15, 2018, pet. granted)
(mem. op.) (extrinsic evidence to construe assignment); Gonzalez v. Janssen, 553 S.W.3d
633 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. filed) (subject to clause and breach of warranty);
Harrison v. Rosetta Res. Operating, L.P., No. 08-15-00318-CV, 2018 WL 3751740 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Aug. 8, 2018, no pet.) (accommodation doctrine); Crow v. Lookadoo, No.
04-17-00338-CV, 2018 WL 4096400 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (term royalty interests).
3. 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018).
4. Id. at 873.
5. Id. at 879.
6. Id. at 863.
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It is expressly understood, however, that if any oil, gas, or mineral or
mining lease covering said land . . . is maintained in force and effect
by payment of shut-in royalties or any other similar payments made
to the lessors or royalty holder in lieu of actual production while
there is located on the lease or land pooled therewith a well or mine
capable of producing oil, gas, or other minerals in paying or commer-
cial quantities but shut-in for lack of market or any other reasons,
then . . . it will be considered that production in paying or commer-
cial quantities is being obtained from the land herein conveyed.7
In 2009, the current lessee (Lessee) paid $24,000 to extend the lease
term to October 22, 2012. The land was leased and pooled, but near the
end of the fifteen-year term of the NPRI there was no actual production.8
When there was only four months left on the fifteen-year term of the
NPRI, Grantor assigned a 60% interest in the NPRI to Lessee, “presuma-
bly as an incentive to motivate [Lessee] to begin drilling.”9 On December
7, 2011, Lessee tendered shut-in royalty payments to the lessor (who was
also the Grantee under the deed creating the term NPRI), and it was
undisputed that there was no actual production on December 27, 2011,
the date the NPRI term ended. “[T]he parties offered conflicting sum-
mary judgment evidence as to whether there was a well capable of pro-
ducing in paying . . . quantities” on that date.10 In February 2012, actual
production commenced.11 Lessee contended that Grantee’s future inter-
est in the NPRI under the deed “was void under the rule against perpetu-
ities” (Rule) and that Lessee’s “activities satisfied the deed’s savings
clause.”12 That is, Lessee was aligned with Grantor to preserve the re-
served NPRI, because Lessee owned 60% of the NPRI.
“The Texas [c]onstitution prohibits perpetuities: ‘Perpetuities . . . are
contrary to the genius of free government, and shall never be allowed.’”13
Although the constitution provides no definition of “perpetuities,” the
Texas Supreme Court has adopted the common law version of the Rule,
which provides that “no interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all,
within twenty-one years after the death of some life or lives in being at
the time of the conveyance.”14 “The Rule requires that a challenged con-
veyance be viewed as of the date the instrument is executed, and the in-
terest is void if by any possible contingency the grant or devise could
violate the Rule.”15
Under the Rule, Grantor’s interest in the NPRI was a vested fee sim-
ple, subject to an executory limitation. Grantee’s interest in the NPRI
7. Id.
8. Id. at 863–64.
9. Id. at 863.
10. Id. at 864 (emphasis in original).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 866 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26).
14. Id. at 867 (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex.
2017)).
15. Id. (citing Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982)).
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was a springing executory interest that would not vest until the conditions
terminating Grantor’s present possessory interest were met (the lack of
or cessation of production at some indeterminable time). Therefore,
Grantee’s interest violated the Rule and was void.16
However, the supreme court decided to carve out an exception for oil
and gas conveyances. The purpose of the Rule is to prevent “landowners
from using remote contingencies to preclude alienability of land for gen-
erations.”17 “But here, [Grantor’s] fee simple interest in the NPRI was
certain to end, either because production in paying or commercial quanti-
ties ceased, . . . or the recoverable minerals were exhausted.”18 If Grantor
had conveyed in fee simple absolute to Grantee, and then Grantee had
conveyed the same term NPRI back to Grantor, in a separate convey-
ance, Grantee’s future interest in the NPRI would not violate the Rule
because it would be classified as a vested possibility of reverter.19 Re-
straint on alienation is not an issue in the oil and gas context, and defeasi-
ble term interests in minerals actually promote alienability of land.20
[I]t is appropriate to hold that in this oil and gas context, where a
defeasible term interest is created by reservation, leaving an execu-
tory interest that is certain to vest in an ascertainable grantee, the
Rule does not invalidate the grantee’s future interest. . . . We limit
our holding to future interests in the oil and gas context in which the
holder of the interest is ascertainable and the preceding estate is cer-
tain to terminate.21
After holding that the Rule did not void the Grantee’s interest, the
supreme court turned to the issue of whether Lessee’s actions had perpet-
uated the NPRI under the savings clause. The supreme court held that
“other similar payments” was ambiguous as a matter of law, summary
judgment was inappropriate, and therefore remanded on the perpetua-
tion of the NPRI.22
“Other similar payments” could mean delay rentals, extension pay-
ments, or any payment made during the secondary term in lieu of produc-
tion.23 “[T]here are both similarities and differences between shut-in
royalties, delay rentals, and paid-up leases, depending on the criteria used
to compare them.”24 Therefore, the supreme court determined that
“there is more than one reasonable interpretation of ‘other similar pay-
ments,’” making the savings clause ambiguous.25
In a separate issue, the supreme court held that the Natural Resources
16. Id. at 868 (citing Peveto, 645 S.W.2d at 772).
17. Id. at 869, 873 (citing Kettler v. Atkinson, 383 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1964)).
18. Id. at 871 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Braslau, 561 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. 1978);
Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959)).
19. Id. at 868.
20. Id. at 869.
21. Id. at 873.
22. Id. at 874–75.
23. Id. at 875.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Code did not preclude a breach of contract claim.26 Grantee as Lessor
was pursuing a breach of contract claim under the lease based on Lessee’s
failure to timely pay royalties.27 Lessee contended there could be no
breach of contract claim because Natural Resources Code Section
91.402(b) permits payments to be withheld without interest when there is
a title dispute.28 The lease contained its own payment schedule and re-
cited that Lessee assumed all risk of title failures.29
Section 91.404(c) provide[d] a cause of action for a payee if the
payor d[id] not comply with the requirements set out in section
91.402, but this d[id] not mean that the statute abrogate[d] a com-
mon law claim for breach of contract when there [wa]s a controlling
lease between the parties.30
There is no clear language from the legislature indicating intent for the
statute to preclude a common law claim of breach of contract.31
The significance of this case is that the rule against perpetuities does
not apply in the oil and gas context if the termination of the prior estate is
certain to occur and the next taker is ascertainable. Additionally, it deter-
mined the phrase “other similar payments” was ambiguous in a savings
clause. It is also a significant holding that the division order statute (gov-
erning payment of royalties, suspension of payments, and interest) does
not bar a contractual claim for payment and interest under the oil and gas
lease.
B. YOWELL V. GRANITE OPERATING CO. (ANTI-WASHOUT
PROVISION FOR OVERRIDING ROYALTY)
Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.32 held that an anti-washout clause in-
tended to preserve an overriding royalty interest was void under the rule
against perpetuities (Rule).33 The parties aligned as Assignor and As-
signee under a 1986 assignment of the Subject Leases. In the assignment,
Assignor reserved an overriding royalty in the Subject Leases. Later, the
Subject Leases were top leased, there was litigation over production in
paying quantities, and that litigation was settled. As part of the settle-
ment, the Subject Leases were released, and Assignee acquired an inter-
est in the top leases.34 The “anti-washout clause” included in the
assignment stated that: “Should the Subject Leases or any one of the Sub-
ject Leases terminate and in the event Assignee obtains an extension,
renewal or new lease or leases . . . then the overriding royalty interest
reserved herein shall attach to said extension, renewal or new lease or
26. Id. at 879.
27. Id. at 876.
28. Id. at 876 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(a)–(b)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 879.
31. Id.
32. 557 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. filed).
33. Id. at 803.
34. Id. at 798.
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leases . . . .”35 Assignor contended that Assignor’s overriding royalty in-
terest burdened the top leases; Assignee contended that it did not.36
“[A]n overriding royalty interest created by [an] assignment [generally]
does not survive the termination of the assigned lease.”37 It was undis-
puted that the Subject Leases had terminated, and only the anti-washout
clause could save the overriding royalty.38 The parties agreed the top
leases were not an “extension” because they did not continue the under-
lying leases. They disagreed whether they could be considered a “re-
newal” or “new leases.”39 A “renewal” is when an old contract is
replaced by a new contract.40 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
the top leases were not “renewals,” as there were material differences
between the top leases and the Subject Leases.41 The court reasoned that
the top leases were “new leases” because they were independent from the
Subject Leases, and, in fact, adverse to the Subject Leases.42 Under the
language of the anti-washout clause, all the conditions necessary for the
override to attach to the top leases as “new leases” had occurred.43
The court next turned to whether attachment of the override to the top
leases by the anti-washout clause violated the Rule.44 Broadly, the Rule
states that any interest “must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after
the death of some life . . . in being at the time of the conveyance.”45 The
application of the anti-washout clause to a new lease is apparently a ques-
tion of first impression for Texas courts.46 An interest that is contingent
on the expiration of an existing lease generally violates the Rule.47 The
court determined that Assignor’s interest in the new leases was contin-
gent on the expiration of the Subject Leases, which was an indefinite
time.48 Therefore, the Subject Leases were each a fee simple determina-
ble and the application of the anti-washout clause to “new leases” vio-
lated the Rule.49
The court further held that Assignor’s interest depended on the crea-
tion of a new lease, which was an additional uncertain contingency violat-
ing the Rule.50 That is, “[t]he time between the expiration of the [Subject
Leases] and the [possible] creation of a new lease” was an “indeterminate
35. Id. at 800.
36. Id. at 799.
37. Id. at 800 (citing Fain & McGaha v. Biesel, 331 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Fort Worth 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
38. Id. at 801.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Renewal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 801–02.
45. Id. at 802 (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex.
2017)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing BP Am. Prod. Co., 513 S.W.3d at 480).
48. Id. at 802–03.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 803.
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period which could exceed” the limits of the Rule.51 Note that the clause
at issue in this case did not include the common language frequently
found limiting its application to new leases “acquired (e.g., within one
year) from the expiration of the” Subject Leases.52
The court also disagreed with Assignor’s argument that the overriding
interest was a vested interest in 1986 when it was carved out of the Sub-
ject Leases.53 The court reiterated that “[t]here could be no concurrent
vesting of title in a new lease” which has the possibility of never coming
into existence.54
This opinion does not discuss ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopman,55 in
which the Texas Supreme Court held that the Rule would not apply in the
context of certain oil and gas cases, specifically “where a defeasible term
interest is created by reservation, leaving an executory interest that is cer-
tain to vest in an ascertainable grantee.”56 The holding in that case was
expressly limited “to future interests in the oil and gas context in which
the holder of the interest is ascertainable and the preceding estate is cer-
tain to terminate.”57
The significance of the case is the holding that a typical anti-washout
clause designed to preserve an overriding royalty violates the rule against
perpetuities, if applied to new leases.
C. PERRYMAN V. SPARTAN TEXAS SIX CAPITAL PARTNERS, LTD.
(DUHIG DOCTRINE)
Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capital Partners, Ltd.58 construed the
language in a deed to determine whether it created a reservation or an
exception, and whether the Duhig doctrine applied. There were multiple
parties, eight different deeds in the chain of title, and other ancillary is-
sues. However, the principal issue was to construe language from a 1983
deed. Grantor then owned all of the surface and all of the minerals, sub-
ject to an outstanding 1/4 of royalty interest.59 Grantor conveyed the
property with general warranty:
L[ess, save and except] an undivided one-half (1/2) of all royalties
from the production of oil, gas, and/or other minerals that may be
produced from the above described premises which are now owned
by Grantor. It being understood that all of the rest of my ownership
in and to the mineral estate in and under the above described lands is
being conveyed hereby.60
51. Id.
52. Id. at 800–01.
53. Id. at 803.
54. Id.
55. 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018).
56. Id. at 873.
57. Id.
58. 546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018).
59. Id. at 114.
60. Id.
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The deed was silent as to the outstanding royalty interest, and the issue
was to determine the Grantor’s interest after giving effect to the deed.
The trial court construed the deed to reserve 1/2 of the royalties “now
owned” by the Grantor to the Grantor.61 The Fourteenth Houston Court
of Appeals also construed the deed to reserve 1/2 of the royalties “in the
premises” to the Grantor.62 The court of appeals held that “because the
deeds made ‘no mention’ of the ‘previously excepted’ royalty interests,
and yet provided general warranties covering all the title purportedly
conveyed, the grantors breached their warranties and thus ‘are estopped
from claiming a royalty interest in the subject property under the Duhig
doctrine.’”63 The Texas Supreme Court held that the deed “created an
exception from the grant, not a reservation for the [G]rantor.”64 This
clause did not reserve any royalty interest for Grantor because the deed
“conveyed the entire property interest ‘less, save and except’ a 1/2 royalty
interest, and [it] contained no language purporting to ‘reserve’ that ex-
cepted interest for or unto the [Grantor].”65 Therefore, the Duhig doc-
trine did not apply.66
The deed conveyed all of Grantor’s interest, except insofar as that con-
veyance was limited by this clause.67 “Reservations must always be in
favor of and for the benefit of the grantor” in a deed, and reservations are
never implied.68 Because the deed contained an exception, not a reserva-
tion, there was no need to consider Duhig.69
The supreme court analyzed the clause grammatically, utilizing the last-
antecedent construction canon, the series-qualifier canon, and the ab-
sence of a comma to conclude that the now-owned-by-Grantor modifier
applied to the last item in the series.70 That is, “now owned” modified
“premises,” not “royalties.” The supreme court also reasoned that al-
though “a conveyance [of] a portion of the interest the grantor own[ed
might] imply that the grantor does not own and cannot convey [the full]
interest[ ], an exception of a portion of the interest the grantor then owns
does not.”71 “A deed that conveys all of the property interests but ex-
cepts a fraction of the interest the grantor now owns necessarily conveys
all of the interests not excepted.”72 “As a result, the deed[ ] purported to
convey 1/2 and except 1/2 of all of the . . . royalty interests, not just one
61. Id. at 113.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 118; see Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 880–81 (Tex.
1940).
64. Perryman, 546 S.W.3d at 119 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 120.
67. Id. at 119.
68. Id. (quoting Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
69. Id. at 119–20.
70. Id. at 121.
71. Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 123–24.
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half of the royalty interest [Grantor] then owned.”73
The supreme court concluded that the deed conveyed all of the inter-
ests in the surface, mineral, and royalties of the acreage “less, save, and
except” 1/2 of all royalties from the minerals produced from the premises
owned by Grantor.74 The royalty interest passed 1/2 to the grantee, 1/4
was owned by a third party, and Grantor still owned 1/4.75
This is a deed construction case that illustrates the distinction between
a reservation and an exception, and the implications under the Duhig
doctrine.
D. UNITED STATES SHALE ENERGY II, LLC V. LABORDE
PROPERTIES, L.P. (FLOATING OR FIXED ROYALTY)
United States Shale Energy II, LLC v. Laborde Properties, L.P.76 held
that a deed reserved a floating, rather than a fixed, royalty.77 The parties
aligned as Grantor and Grantee under a 1951 deed which provided:
There is reserved and excepted from this conveyance unto the grant-
ors herein, their heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half (1/2) inter-
est in and to the Oil Royalty, Gas Royalty and Royalty in other
Minerals in and under or that may be produced or mined from the
above described premises, the same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/
16) of the production.78
Other than the single sentence quoted above from the deed, there was no
other provision in the deed that might bear on the parties’ intent. There
was no evidence the land was leased when the deed was executed.79 The
land was later leased under an oil and gas lease providing for a lessor’s
royalty of 1/5.80 The issue was whether Grantor reserved a fixed 1/16 roy-
alty or a floating 1/2 of royalty (1/10). The parties sought a declaratory
judgment, and the case was resolved on cross motions for summary
judgment.81
The Texas Supreme Court stated the following:
A fractional royalty interest is referred to as a fixed royalty because
it “remains constant” and is untethered to the royalty amount in a
particular oil and gas lease. . . . A fraction of royalty interest is re-
ferred to as a floating royalty because it varies depending on the roy-
alty in the oil and gas lease in effect and is calculated by multiplying
the fraction in the royalty reservation by the royalty in the lease.82
73. Id. at 124.
74. Id. at 125.
75. Id.
76. 551 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. 2018).
77. Id. at 155.
78. Id. at 150.
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 150.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id. at 152 (citing Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2016)).
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When read independently, the supreme court found that the first clause,
which reserved “an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in” royalty, reserved
a floating royalty interest.83 “The issue is whether the second clause—‘the
same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production’—indicates an
interest fixed at 1/16 of production despite the language in the first clause
tying it to the royalty.”84
The supreme court sought to harmonize the two clauses in a way to
give both clauses effect. The supreme court held that “the only reasona-
ble way to reconcile these clauses is to read the second clause” as modify-
ing the first clause of the deed, and clarifying “what a 1/2 interest in
royalty amounted to when the deed was executed.”85 The supreme court
noted that while no lease was in effect when the deed was executed, the
typical royalty rate at the time was 1/8.86
Thus, if the first clause of the deed reserved a floating royalty interest,
a 1/2 of 1/8 royalty would equal a 1/16 total share of production, giving
effect to both clauses in the deed.87 The supreme court reasoned that this
interpretation was the only way in which the first clause was not made
meaningless “if a lease agreement provides for any royalty rate other
than 1/8 (such as the 1/5 royalty currently in effect).”88 The second clause
clarified “as an incidental factual matter, what a 1/2 interest in the royalty
amounted to when the deed was executed.”89 That is, it was a “nonre-
strictive dependent clause.”90 The supreme court held that the deed
“unambiguously reserved a floating 1/2 royalty interest.”91
The dissenting opinion and the court of appeals would hold that the
reservation was a fixed royalty.92 The dissent reasoned that the first
clause reserves a 1/2 interest in “Oil Royalty, Gas Royalty and Royalty in
other Minerals,” without defining “Royalty.”93 The second clause com-
pleted the description of what is reserved by describing it as 1/16 of pro-
duction.94 That is a fixed royalty.95 “[T]he second clause is not merely
‘incidental’; rather, it is the only language that sheds any light on the first
clause’s meaning.”96 In general, the dissent viewed the entire majority
opinion as flawed because it began with the erroneous assumption that
the first clause, read independently, was a floating royalty.97
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 153–54.
86. Id. at 153.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 153–54.
90. Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 155.
92. Id. at 156 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 157.
94. Id. at 160.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 157.
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The majority’s conclusion that the first clause read independently cre-
ated a floating royalty also appears contrary to conventional wisdom
based on prior caselaw.98 Generally, a reservation “in” royalty is fixed
and a reservation “of” royalty is floating.
It was clearly part of the surrounding circumstances that the parties to
the deed knew that the customary lease royalty was 1/8. As the split deci-
sion indicates, circumstance could “inform” the decision either way.99 It
was unthinkable in 1951 that the lease royalty would be less than 1/8, as
deeds were ordinarily construed against the grantor so as to convey the
greatest estate possible. This could have been another argument for a
fixed 1/16 royalty supporting the dissent.
The case does a good job of assembling case law in this area and sum-
marizing the supreme court’s current holistic approach to deed construc-
tion. However, the majority does not seem to follow that holistic
approach, relying instead upon one clause, disregarding the usual mean-
ing of “in royalty,” and assuming that “1/16 of production” did not mean
1/16 of production.
III. LEASE AND LEASING100
A. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. V. ORCA ASSETS G.P., LLC
(DOUBLE LEASING AND DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY)
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Orca Assets G.P.101 held that Lessee did not
justifiably rely upon Lessor’s misrepresentation that Lessor’s acreage was
open to lease.102 JPMorgan (Bank), admittedly a sophisticated business
entity, acted as Trustee and Lessor managing multiple tracts covering ap-
proximately 40,000 acres in the Eagle Ford Shale.103 Mettham, (Banker)
in charge of leasing for Bank, was also very experienced in leasing, and he
executed approximately seventy-five leases in 2010 for Bank.104 Banker
leased the acreage in question to Lessee #1 in 2010, in one of the largest
deals Banker did for the Trust that year. Lessee #1 did not record its lease
for approximately six months.105 Also during 2010, an experienced man-
98. See id. at 156.
99. Id. at 158.
100. Other Lease and Leasing cases in the reporting period include: Leavitt v. Ballard
Expl. Co., 540 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (interest on
suspended royalties); Martin v. Newfield Expl. Co., No. 13-17-00104-CV, 2018 WL 1633574
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (offset well clause); L.B.
Hailey Ltd. P’ship v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc., No. 5:17-CV-00149-RCL, 2018 WL
3150691 (W.D. Tex. June 27, 2018) (post-production costs); Greeheyco, Inc. v. Brown, 565
S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, no pet.), reh’g denied (Jan. 31, 2019) (continuous
drilling clause); CCI Gulf Coast Upstream, LLC v. Circle X Camp Cooley, Ltd., No. 10-17-
00325-CV, 2018 WL 4624012 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 26, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (free-
gas clause); Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2018, pet. filed) (continuous development clause).
101. 546 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2018).
102. Id. at 650.
103. Id. at 650, 656.
104. See id. at 656.
105. See id. at 650.
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agement team put together a new company (Lessee #2) for the purpose
of acquiring acreage in the Eagle Ford. Lessee #2 was interested in vari-
ous tracts controlled by Bank that Banker said were open. Lessee #2
knew that Bank customarily used a “no warranty” lease form, but, during
the negotiations, Bank also insisted on expanding the “no warranty” lan-
guage to include language that any lease would also be “without recourse
against Lessor in the event of a failure of title, not even for the return of
the bonus . . . .”106 The change resulted in renegotiated terms for a letter
of intent giving Lessee #2 thirty days after execution to re-examine
title.107
Until the letter of intent was signed, Lessee #2 checked title regularly
and knew the acreage was open. After the letter of intent was signed,
Lessee #2 stopped checking. Three days after the letter of intent was
signed, Lessee #1 filed its lease of record.108 During the thirty-day period,
Lessee #2 re-evaluated its existing title work, and then closed with Bank
on two leases for a $3.2 million bonus payment.109 After Lessee #1 as-
serted priority, Bank tendered the $3.2 million back to Lessee #2, al-
though Bank contended it was not obligated to do so. Lessee #2 rejected
the tender, and sued Bank for $400 million in lost profits on theories of
fraud and negligent misrepresentation.110 The case was resolved under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Section 166(g), which was effectively a
summary judgment, for Bank.111
Fraud and negligent misrepresentation both include an element of jus-
tifiable reliance.112 “Rule 166(g) authorizes trial courts to decide matters
that, though ordinarily fact questions, have become questions of law be-
cause ‘reasonable minds cannot differ on the outcome.’”113
In this case, the misrepresentation upon which Lessee #2 relied turned
on statements made by Banker during the negotiations. At the first meet-
ing and at closing, Banker said the acreage was open. It was conceded
that this representation was false, so the only issue was justifiable reli-
ance.114 The Texas Supreme Court held that reliance was not justified on
two separate theories: (1) “red flags” indicating reliance is unjustified,
and (2) direct contradiction.115
In Grant Thornton, the Texas Supreme Court “held that a person may
not justifiably rely on a misrepresentation if there are red flags indicating
106. Id. at 650–51.
107. Id. at 651.
108. Id. at 652, 658.
109. Id. at 652.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 653–54 (citing Grant Thornton, LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314
S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tex. 2010); Fed. Land Bank Ass’n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442
(Tex. 1992)).
113. Id. at 653 (quoting Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303, 322
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).
114. Id. at 654.
115. Id. at 660.
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such reliance is unwarranted.”116 The supreme court then examined at
length the particular facts in this case.117 The supreme court also ex-
amined at length the particular representations made that the acreage
was open, offset by the written agreement that directly contradicted that
representation.118
The supreme court stated the following:
We are not prepared to say that any single one of these [facts in this
case] could preclude justifiable reliance on its own and as a matter of
law. We especially reject the notion that the mere use of the nega-
tion-of-warranty and no-recourse provision in the letter of intent and
the leases could wholly negate justifiable reliance. . . . [W]e must
instead view the circumstances in their entirety while accounting for
the parties’ relative levels of sophistication.119
After balancing all of the circumstances, the supreme court concluded
that Lessee #2 could not show justifiable reliance.120
This is a fact specific case that may not offer very useful guidelines, but
it is in the context of the fairly common circumstance of a lessor who
thinks he may have open acreage but refuses to warrant title. Buyer
beware.
B. XOG OPERATING, LLC V. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION LTD.
PARTNERSHIP (RETAINED ACREAGE CLAUSE)
XOG Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Exploration Ltd. Partnership121
held that a retained acreage clause that turned on the size of a proration
unit as prescribed by the Railroad Commission of Texas (TRC) was con-
trolled by the Special Field Rules regardless of the acreage assigned by
the operator to a proration unit.122 The parties aligned as Assignor and
Assignee under a term assignment (Assignment). Assignor conveyed to
Assignee four leases covering 1,625.8 acres for a primary term of two
years.123 A retained-acreage provision in the Assignment provided that
after the primary term, the leases would revert back to Assignor save and
except the following:
[T]hat portion of [the leased acreage] included within the proration
or pooled unit of each well drilled . . . . The term “proration unit” as
used herein, shall mean the area within the surface boundaries of the
proration unit then established or prescribed by field rules or special
order of the appropriate regulatory authority for the reservoir in
which each well is completed. In the absence of such field rules or
116. Id. at 655 (citing Grant Thornton, 314 S.W.3d at 923 (internal quotations
omitted)).
117. See id. at 655–58.
118. See id. at 658–60.
119. Id. at 655–56.
120. Id. at 660.
121. 554 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. 2018).
122. Id. at 608–09.
123. Id. at 609.
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special order, each proration unit shall be deemed to be 320 acres of
land . . . .124
During the primary term, Assignee completed six wells.125 Five of the six
wells were in the same field, and Special Field Rule 2 provided: “The
acreage assigned to the individual gas well for the purpose of allocating
allowable gas production thereto shall be known as the prescribed prora-
tion unit. . . . For allowable assignment purposes, the prescribed proration
unit shall be a [320] acre unit.”126 The field rule also provided that a pro-
ration unit of less than 320 acres is a “fractional proration unit.”127 The
sixth well drilled by Assignee had no applicable field rules.128 In its regu-
latory filings with the TRC, Assignee assigned 800 total acres to proration
units for four of its six wells.129
When the primary term of the Assignment expired, Assignor asserted
that the retained-acreage provision held 804 acres (the assigned 800 acres
for four wells, and two acres for each of the two remaining wells). As-
signor demanded the reassignment of the remaining 821.8 acres (1,625.8
acres less 804 acres) to Assignor. Assignee refused, and asserted that the
retained-acreage provision applied to 1,920 acres (320 prescribed acres
for each of the six wells).130 The main issue was whether Assignee re-
tained all of the acreage under the retained-acreage provision.
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the plain language of the retained-
acreage provision and keyed in on the word “prescribed.”131 The provi-
sion provides that the “proration unit” will be retained, and proration
unit is defined in the provision as “the area within the surface boundaries
of the proration unit then . . . prescribed by field rules . . . . In the absence
of such field rules . . ., each proration unit shall be . . . 320 acres.”132 The
supreme court found that because five of the six wells had field rules
which prescribed 320 acres to a unit (and anything smaller was a frac-
tional unit), and because the sole remaining well had no field rules, the
six wells in total held more acreage than the acreage originally assigned,
as Assignee argued.133
Assignor contended the text of the provision limited itself by stating
the retained-acreage is that which is “included within” the proration unit,
and that only an operator can include acreage in a unit, not the TRC.134
However, the supreme court disagreed, citing the express usage of the
word “prescribed” in the provision as controlling.135
124. Id. at 610.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 611.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 612–13.
132. Id. at 612.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Assignor further argued that this retained-acreage provision should ap-
ply the same as the provision in the companion case Endeavor Energy,136
“which allowed an operator to retain [only the] land” it included in its
regulatory filings.137 However, in the Endeavor Energy case, the retained-
acreage provision referred to “assigned” units, and here the units were
“prescribed.”138 In Jones v. Killingsworth,139 the Texas Supreme Court
found that the TRC may prescribe proration units and at the same time
permit operators to assign units of other sizes, so the terms “are not mu-
tually exclusive.”140 Ultimately, the distinguishing factor between the En-
deavor Energy case and this case was that, in Endeavor Energy, the term
“prescribed proration unit” was not included in the retained-acreage pro-
vision or the field rules, but in the present case, the term was in both
places.141
Assignor offered a number of other arguments, including that (1) the
field rules only provided a maximum proration unit; (2) the field rules
were not created for the purpose of determining the meaning of retained-
acreage provisions; and (3) a result different than Endeavor Energy
would create confusion.142 However, the supreme court found that the
field rules were clear about the 320-acre units.143 Additionally, parties are
free to include language from field rules into their contract, and the su-
preme court reiterated the Endeavor Energy case is different than this
case.144 The supreme court held that Assignee retained all of the acreage
in the leases assigned in the Assignment.145
This is a contract construction case, and the supreme court has been
consistent on insisting that agreements be construed so as to give words
their plain meaning. Parties defining property rights by reference to regu-
latory matters are on notice that, as to proration units, there is a meaning-
ful difference between acres prescribed and acres assigned.
C. ENDEAVOR ENERGY RESOURCES, L.P. V. DISCOVERY OPERATING,
INC. (RETAINED ACREAGE CLAUSE)
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc.146 held
that a proration unit assigned to a well in a retained acreage clause re-
ferred to the operator’s assignment of acreage in its regulatory filings
with the TRC.147 Endeavor Energy Resources (Operator) leased and
completed multiple wells on its lease under Special Field Rules that pro-
136. 554 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2018).
137. XOG Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 612–13.
138. Id. at 613.
139. 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965).
140. XOG Operating, 554 S.W.3d at 613 (citing Jones, 403 S.W.2d at 328).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 554 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2018).
147. Id. at 589.
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vided for 80-acre spacing and optional 160-acre spacing. Operator desig-
nated 80-acre proration units for its wells,148 and its lease termed out
under the retained acreage clause, which provided:
[T]he lease shall automatically terminate as to all lands and depths
covered herein, save and except those lands and depths located
within a governmental proration unit assigned to a well . . . with each
such governmental proration unit to contain the number of acres re-
quired to comply with the applicable rules and regulations of the
Railroad Commission of Texas for obtaining the maximum producing
allowable for the particular well.149
Discovery Operating, Inc. (Lessee) acquired a top lease on the acreage
not included in the proration units and drilled additional wells on the
lands originally leased by Operator, but not included in Operator’s desig-
nated proration units. When Operator learned of Lessee’s wells, it filed
amended plats to include 160 acres for each of Operator’s wells.150 Lessee
filed a trespass-to-try-title action against Operator. The TRC did not act
on the amended plats because of the suit. The interpretation of the re-
tained acreage clause turned on the meaning of the phrases “‘proration
unit assigned to a well’ and ‘maximum producing allowable for the partic-
ular well.’”151
One way the TRC manages mineral resources is by using production
allowables and proration units.152 “Generally, ‘an operator must first des-
ignate [a well’s] proration unit and the acreage assigned to it, then certify
that the acreage is productive before receiving the well’s production al-
lowable.’”153 The TRC requires operators “to ‘file certified plats of their
properties in the field, which plats show all those things pertinent to the
determination of the acreage claimed for each well . . . .’”154 The field
rules for the area where Operator’s leases are located established a stan-
dard 80-acre proration unit, but allowed an operator to “assign a toler-
ance of not more than [80] acres of additional unassigned lease acreage to
a well on an [80] acre unit and shall in such event receive allowable credit
for not more than [160] acres.”155
When the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the phrase “proration unit
assigned to a well” the focus was on the word “assigned.”156 Operator
argued the TRC assigned the 160-acre maximum. However, Lessee ar-
148. Id. at 591–92.
149. Id. at 600 (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 593–94.
151. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 596.
153. Id. (quoting Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Austin
2000, pet. denied)).
154. Id. at 599 (quoting Tex. R.R. Comm’n, Special Order Adopting Rules and Regula-
tions for the Spraberry Trend Area Field, Oil & Gas Docket Nos. 125 & 126, 7 & 8–25,841
(Dec. 22, 1952)).
155. Id. (quoting Tex. R.R. Comm’n, Final Order Amending Field Rule Nos. 2 and 3 in
the Spraberry (Trend Area) Field Various Counties, Texas, Oil and Gas Docket No. 08-
0259977 (Dec. 16, 2008)).
156. Id. at 601.
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gued the lessee or operator, Endeavor in this case, assigned the acreage,
not the TRC.157 “[T]he [TRC]’s statewide and field rules [acknowledge]
the operator is responsible for ‘assigning’ acreage to a proration unit [in]
its regulatory filings.”158 This has consistently been upheld in the courts,
and an amicus brief from the TRC concurred.159 The TRC’s brief stated,
“[I]f the operator’s assignment of acreage complies with the rules, the
[TRC] will input that acreage into a well-tracking system, and it becomes
‘the lawfully assigned proration acreage for purposes of the [TRC’s]
records.’”160 The supreme court concluded that “‘assigned’ [was] unam-
biguous and refer[red] to the [operator’s] assignment of acreage [in] its
regulatory filings.”161
Operator argued that the TRC’s records cannot determine title. How-
ever, this “ignores the contractual nature of [Operator’s] leasehold inter-
est.”162 “Although the [TRC] does not unilaterally determine title by
approving or accepting an operator’s assigned proration unit, the parties
are free to agree that the operator’s leasehold interest will survive and
continue only to the extent of that assignment.”163
Operator also contended that, regardless of the “assigned” language,
the “maximum producing allowable” language meant that each unit auto-
matically consisted of 160 acres.164 Rule 4 of the Special Field Rules “pro-
vides that the maximum producing allowable for a well on an 80-acre
proration unit is 515 barrels per day,”165 but it was undisputed that Oper-
ator’s wells were producing below the allowable.166
Thus, Operator did exactly what it was required to do under the lease:
it applied for the proration unit that would give it the maximum allowa-
ble.167 “Rule 3 [of the Special Field Rules] provides that [Operator] could
have attempted to assign to each of its existing proration units an addi-
tional 80 acres of ‘tolerance acreage.’”168 In dicta, in an earlier draft of
the opinion, the supreme court suggested that attempting to assign more
acreage may have subjected Operator to liability for attempting to retain
more acreage than the acreage required to obtain the maximum allowa-
ble.169 The only citation was to a secondary authority and presumably
refers to possible contractual liability to lessor for claiming too much
acreage.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 602.
159. Id. at 602 n.10.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 603.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 604.
166. Id. at 605.
167. Id. at 605–06.
168. Id. at 605.
169. See Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., No. 15-0155, 2018
WL 1770290, at *12 (Tex. Apr. 13, 2018).
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The significance of this case is that operators, not the TRC, assign acre-
age to proration units for their wells. The TRC establishes the number of
acres required or permitted for a proration unit, but the operators assign
the acres to be included in a specific proration unit.
D. TRO-X, L.P. V. ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP. (LEASE
TERMINATED BY SUBSEQUENT LEASE)
TRO-X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.170 held that “when a lessor
and lessee under an existing lease execute a new lease of the same min-
eral interests subject to the existing lease, the existing lease is terminated
unless the new lease objectively demonstrates both parties’ intent other-
wise.”171 In 2007, Lessor leased multiple tracts (2007 Leases), and the
2007 Leases were eventually acquired by Anadarko.172 In 2009,
Anadarko failed to drill an offset well, and that failure may or may not
have terminated the 2007 Leases. In 2011, Lessor demanded a release of
the 2007 Leases. Lessor and Anadarko negotiated for leases on different
terms (2011 Leases).173 The earliest 2011 Lease was executed June 15,
2011, and all Leases were executed before June 30, 2011, but all 2011
Leases were effective on June 17, 2011. On June 30, 2011, the 2011 Leases
were recorded, and Anadarko executed a release of the 2007 Leases.
Anadarko’s interest in the 2017 Leases was acquired subject to a partici-
pation agreement under which TRO-X owned a 5% back-in after payout,
which also applied to “top leases.” TRO-X contended that the 2011
Leases were top leases, and therefore subject to TRO-X’s 5% back-in.174
The Participation Agreement contained an anti-washout clause to protect
the back-in option that extended to “any renewal(s), extension(s), or top
lease(s) taken within one (1) year of termination of the underlying inter-
est.”175 The issue was whether the 2011 Leases were top leases that did
not wash-out TRO-X’s back-in, or new leases that washed out TRO-X’s
back-in.
TRO-X contended that the 2011 Leases were top leases because “they
neither make any mention of the 2007 Leases nor contain any indication
that Anadarko and the [Lessors] intended the 2011 Leases to terminate
the 2007 Leases.”176 Anadarko argued that Ridge Oil stands “for the pro-
position that parties to an oil and gas lease terminate an existing mineral
lease between them if they enter into a new lease with ‘the intent and
understanding that, by doing so, they would effect a release’ of the prior
lease.”177 Further, Anadarko maintained that the 2011 Leases did not ex-
ist at the same time as the 2007 Leases, because the execution of the 2011
170. 548 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2018).
171. Id. at 464.
172. Id. at 459–60.
173. Id. at 460.
174. Id. at 461.
175. Id. at 460.
176. Id. at 461.
177. Id. (quoting Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2004)).
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Leases terminated the 2007 Leases. Therefore, the 2011 Leases cannot be
top leases.178
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Anadarko.179 “In Ridge Oil, we
recognized that ‘[e]ven if an oil and gas lease does not contain a surren-
der clause, the parties may mutually agree to a release, or they effectively
terminate their lease by signing a new one.’”180 “TRO–X observe[d] that
the Ridge Oil opinion cited Sasser, which TRO–X claim[ed] stands for the
proposition that a subsequent lease cannot terminate a previous lease
without evidence that the parties intended to do so.”181 However, the
supreme court disagreed with TRO-X’s assertion, and held that “an ex-
isting lease . . . terminates when the parties enter into a new lease cover-
ing that interest unless the new lease objectively demonstrates that both
parties intended for the new lease not to terminate the prior lease be-
tween them.”182 Further, “[a] party contending that a new lease did not
terminate the previous one has the burden to prove and obtain a finding
that the parties intended for the previous lease to survive execution of the
new lease.”183
The supreme court found that no overlap existed between the 2007
Leases and the 2011 Leases, because the 2011 Leases terminated the 2007
Leases.184 Therefore, there was no “top” lease.185 Note that the supreme
court did not consider whether the 2011 Leases were extensions or re-
newals under the anti-washout clause of the participation agreement, be-
cause TRO-X only asserted the 2011 Leases were top leases.186
The significance of this case is the holding that when a lessor and lessee
under an existing lease execute a new lease of the same mineral interests
subject to the existing lease, the existing lease is terminated unless the
new lease objectively demonstrates both parties intended otherwise.
E. MURPHY EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CO.–USA V. ADAMS
(LOCATION OF OFFSET WELL)
Murphy Exploration & Production Co.–USA v. Adams187 held that a
horizontal well offsetting a horizontal well could be drilled anywhere on
the leased premises under the terms of the offset well clause in the
lease.188 Well-established concepts applicable to vertical wells may not be
applicable in the context of horizontal wells. The offset operator drilled a
178. Id. at 462.
179. Id. at 463.
180. Id. (quoting Ridge Oil, 148 S.W.3d at 152–53 (emphasis in original)).
181. Id. (citing Ridge Oil, 148 S.W.3d at 153 n.34; Sasser v. Dantex Oil & Gas, Inc., 906
S.W.2d 599, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied)).
182. Id. (citing Ridge Oil, 148 S.W.3d at 152–53 (emphasis in original)).
183. Id. at 464.
184. Id. at 466.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 465.
187. 560 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2018), reh’g denied (Nov. 30, 2018), opinion corrected and
superseded.
188. Id. at 105.
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horizontal well with a 1,800 foot lateral in the Eagle Ford Shale, 350 feet
from the lease boundary parallel to the lease line, which triggered the
offset well clause in Lessee’s lease (because it was drilled less than 467
feet from the lease line).189 Lessee elected to drill under the offset well
clause, which required Lessee “to commence drilling operations on the
leased acreage and thereafter continue the drilling of such offset well or
wells with due diligence to a depth adequate to test the same formation
from which the well or wells are producing from [sic] on the adjacent
acreage . . . .”190 Lessee drilled a horizontal well with a 1,800 foot lateral
in the Eagle Ford Shale 1,800 feet from and parallel to the lease line with
the offset operator. Lessor sued Lessee for breach of contract, alleging
that Lessee’s location failed to comply with the offset well clause.191
Lessee counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief regarding its obliga-
tions under and compliance with the offset well clause.192 Lessor argued
that an offset well “must be in close proximity to the lease line adjacent
to the tract where the neighboring well is located” in order to prevent
drainage, and that Lessee’s well was not.193 Lessee argued that the only
specific requirements in the clause were that the well be “‘on the leased
acreage’ and ‘to a depth adequate to test the same formation,’” and that
both requirements were met by Lessee’s well.194 It was undisputed that
the lease was “drafted with horizontal shale drilling in mind.”195 There-
fore, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he realities of this type
of drilling are thus part of the ‘facts and circumstances surrounding the
contract’s execution’ that may ‘inform’ our construction of the lease
language.”196
The supreme court contrasted vertical drilling to horizontal drilling
with hydraulic fracturing, in which points along the horizontal wellbore
are perforated and fractured and oil and gas is drained from surrounding
rock.197 “[H]orizontal drilling does not involve shared reservoirs in the
same sense” as vertical drilling because, although “the same strata of
shale may underlie two separate tracts, little or no drainage will occur
between the two tracts.”198
With this context in mind, the supreme court concluded that while an
implied proximity requirement may be a “reasonable premise in the con-
text of vertical drilling, where placement of an offset well is an important
factor in minimizing the amount of oil or gas being drained,” the “same
principle does not apply in the context of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
189. Id. at 107.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 109–10.
194. Id. at 108.
195. Id. at 110.
196. Id. (quoting URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 757–58, 765 (Tex. 2018)).
197. Id. at 110–11.
198. Jason Newman & Louis E. Layrisson III, Offset Clauses in a World Without Drain-
age, 9 TEX. J. OIL & ENERGY L. 1, 25 (2013).
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fracturing.”199 The supreme court noted that the offset clause “makes
complete sense if the parties intended to require accelerated drilling
when production from a well on an adjacent tract evidenced that the
leased tract was also capable of production,” and stated that “this is the
only reasonable interpretation of the provision in light of the parties’ rec-
ognition of the horizontal shale drilling at issue.”200 The supreme court
completed its analysis by limiting its holding to the circumstances of this
case, which involved “unconventional production in tight shale
formations.”201
The opinion strictly and literally construes the terms of the agreement
which is consistent with the supreme court’s recent opinions. The diffi-
culty was in finding a meaning for “offset” in the context of drilling in
which no drainage can occur. The supreme court concluded that it was a
trigger for accelerated drilling, unrelated to drainage, but nevertheless a
trigger tied to propinquity.
F. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION CO., L.P. V. APACHE CORP.
(PAYMENTS TO NON-PARTICIPATING LESSEE’S
ROYALTY OWNERS)
Devon Energy Production Co. v. Apache Corp.202 held that the opera-
tor of a well was not responsible under the Texas Natural Resources
Code for paying royalties directly to lessors with whom the operator did
not have a lease.203 Apache had 1/3 of the minerals under the lease and
Devon had 2/3 of the minerals under the lease. They were unable to agree
upon a joint operating agreement, and Apache drilled seven producing
wells. After Apache recovered its costs, Apache paid Devon “its two-
thirds share of the net revenue to which Apache believed Devon was
entitled as Apache’s cotenant in the mineral estate.”204 Devon’s lessors
sued both Apache and Devon, and all claims were eventually resolved,
except Devon’s claim that Apache was obligated to pay royalties directly
to Devon’s lessors under the Texas Natural Resources Code.205
The Eastland Court of Appeals noted that the law was clear that
Devon, as lessee, became the mineral cotenant with Apache, as lessee,
and that the producing cotenant Apache was obligated to account to
Devon as the nonproducing cotenant.206 However, the issue here was to
determine which party was obligated to Devon’s lessors. Devon asserted
that Section 91.402 of the Texas Natural Resources Code required
Apache to directly and immediately pay to Devon’s lessors the royalty
199. Murphy Expl., 560 S.W.3d at 112.
200. Id. at 113.
201. Id.
202. 550 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied).
203. Id. at 264.
204. Id. at 260.
205. Id. at 260–61.
206. Id. at 261.
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payments due under the leases between Devon and Devon’s lessors.207
Section 91.402(a) states:
The proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas production from an
oil and gas well located in this state must be paid to each payee by
payor on or before 120 days after the end of the month of first sale of
production from the well. After that time, payments must be made to
each payee on a timely basis according to the frequency of payment
specified in a lease or other written agreement between payee and
payor.208
The court noted that the critical inquiry was whether Apache and
Devon’s lessors had a “payor-payee” relationship.209 Section 91.401(2)
defines “payor” as:
[T]he party who undertakes to distribute oil and gas proceeds to the
payee . . . as operator of the well from which such production was
obtained or as lessee under the lease on which royalty is due. The
payor is the first purchaser of such production of oil or gas from an
oil or gas well . . . .210
Section 91.401(1) defines “payee” as: “any person or persons legally enti-
tled to payment from the proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas
from an oil or gas well located in this state.”211 Devon argued “that
Apache [was] a ‘payor’ because Apache was the ‘operator of the well
from which [oil and gas] production was obtained,’” and “that the Lessor
Plaintiffs were ‘payees’ because they were ‘legally entitled to payment
from the proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas from an oil or gas
well located in this state.’”212 The court disagreed.213
“In construing the definition of ‘payee,’” the court reasoned that “the
phrase ‘legally entitled to payment’ is significant.”214 Also, the court rea-
soned that “in construing the definition of ‘payor,’ the word ‘undertakes’
is significant.”215 The court noted that “[t]he dictionary defines ‘under-
take’ as ‘[t]o take on an obligation or task.’”216 Thus, the court found that
in order to “qualify as a ‘payor’ who owes a ‘payee,’ the ‘payor’ must
have ‘undertake[n]’—set out to obligate itself—to the ‘payee’ in some
way.”217 Moreover, the court concluded that Devon’s lessors were “not
‘payees’ of Apache because Apache never ‘undertook’ to enter into a
legally binding relationship with them, such that [Devon’s lessors] were
then ‘legally entitled to payment’ from Apache.”218
207. Id. at 262 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402).
208. Id. (quoting NAT. RES. CODE § 91.402(a)).
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting NAT. RES. CODE § 91.401(2)).
211. Id. (quoting NAT. RES. CODE § 91.401(1)).
212. Id. at 262–63.
213. Id. at 263.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting Undertake, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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The court also held that even if Devon’s lessors were payees under the
Texas Natural Resources Code, Apache did not fit within the statutory
definition of payor.219 Devon relied upon Prize Energy, which held that
the operator was a payor and the owner of a nonparticipating royalty was
a payee.220 The court found a royalty interest and a NPRI to be distin-
guishable because by the very act of drilling, the operator undertook to
pay the NPRI owner.221 Thus, Apache and Devon’s lessor did not have a
payor-payee relationship under the Texas Natural Resources Code.222
This case is significant because it holds that the operator has no duty to
pay the nonparticipating lessee’s lessors. The opinion does not address
the other questions surrounding the nonparticipating lessee’s duties, such
as when to pay, and the nonparticipant’s lease terms are sure to have
some effect on lessee’s obligations.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS223
A. ALLEN DRILLING ACQUISITION CO. V. CRIMSON EXPLORATION
INC. (JOA REMEDIES FOR DEFAULT)
Allen Drilling Acquisition Co. v. Crimson Exploration Inc.224 held that
an operator who invoked the deemed non-consent election against a de-
faulting nonoperator waived the right to sue the nonoperator for unpaid
well costs, but did not waive any of the other specific remedies available
to the operator under the 1989 Model Form Joint Operating Agreements
(JOAs).225 The facts involved multiple agreements, with overlapping joint
operating agreements, areas of mutual interest and contract areas, with
multiple breach of contract claims, with limitations and waiver issues, and
billing disputes—all largely resolved on competing motions for summary
judgment. The Waco Court of Appeals determined which agreements
were applicable, the mineral formations to which they applied, and the
remedies to which the parties were entitled. These issues were mostly
matters of contract construction, but many of the issues could be of inter-
219. Id.
220. Id. (citing Prize Energy Res., L.P. v. Cliff Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 561 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)).
221. Id. at 264.
222. Id.
223. Other industry contracts cases in the reporting period include: Glassell Non-
Operated Interests, Ltd. v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, LLC, CV H-16-1573, 2017 WL 6626652
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017), rev’d, 927 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2019) (area of mutual interest);
Basic Energy Services., L.P. v. EXCO Res., Inc., No. 05-15-00667-CV, 2018 WL 564157
(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (indemnities in a Master Services
Agreement); Dimock Operating Co. v. Sutherland Energy Co., No. 07-16-00230-CV, 2018
WL 2074643 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 24, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (calculation of
payout under FOA); TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. filed) (force majeure and foreseeability); MJR Oil &
Gas 2001 LLC v. AriesOne, L.P., 558 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.)
(ROFR as covenant running with land).
224. 558 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. filed).
225. Id. at 779.
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est, particularly in the context of overlapping JOAs, and in the area of
mutual interest agreements.
However, the issue of general interest involved remedies and the de-
faulting nonoperator. Three wells were drilled.226 Two of the wells were
obligation wells, and the nonoperator could not elect not to partici-
pate.227 Cost of the wells skyrocketed over the original estimates, the no-
noperator failed to pay, and the operator deemed the nonoperator a non-
consenting party.228 The operator could not recover its costs from the
wells.229 The JOA principally controlling the dispute was based upon the
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) Form Operating
Agreement 610-1989.230 The operator ultimately sought to foreclose on
the nonoperator’s interest.231
It was undisputed that the wells were drilled under the JOA, that the
nonoperator defaulted in the payment of well costs, and that the operator
deemed the nonoperator to be a non-consenting party as to the wells
drilled. However, when the operator sought to foreclose its lien, the no-
noperator asserted that the nonoperator was not in default as a non-con-
senting party and that the operator’s relief was limited to proceeds from
the wells.232 The deemed non-consent remedy that was at issue in this
JOA provided:
Operator . . . may deliver a written Notice of Non-consent Election
to the defaulting party at any time after the expiration of the fifteen
day cure period following delivery of the Notice of Default, in which
event . . . the nonpaying party [Nonoperator] will be conclusively
deemed to have elected not to participate in the operation and to be
a Non-Consenting Party with respect thereto under Article VI.B or
VI.C. to the extent of the costs unpaid by such party, notwithstand-
ing any election to participate theretofore made. If election is made
to proceed under this provision, then non-defaulting party [Operator]
may not elect to sue for the unpaid amount.233
The nonoperator conceded that it was subject to the provisions of the
JOA denying the nonoperator a share of the proceeds from the wells un-
til the operator recovered 400% of the well costs, but the nonoperator
contended that the non-consent penalty was the only recourse available
to the operator.234 The court disagreed.235 “The deemed non-consent
provision specifically spelled out the other remedy that would not be
available as the suit for damages. No other remedy is specifically ex-
cluded; therefore, the other remedies [in the JOA] continued to be availa-
226. Id. at 766.
227. Id. at 777 n.11.
228. Id. at 766.
229. Id. at 779 n.14.
230. Id. at 765 n.2.
231. Id. at 777.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 778 (emphasis added by the court).
234. Id. at 779.
235. Id.
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ble to [the operator].”236 The court based its holding on the plain
language of the JOA.237
The nonoperator also contended that a party electing to go non-con-
sent is not in breach of contract.238 The court held that the nonoperator
did not elect to go non-consent and also could not elect to go non-consent
as to the obligation wells.239 “The crucial distinction here, however, is
that [the nonoperator] did not elect to go non-consent.”240 As a default-
ing non-consenting party, the other remedies provided in the JOA were
also available to the operator. The underlying default continued to
exist.241
Article XVI.1 of the JOA authorized the operator to “suspend any or
all of the rights of the defaulting party granted by this Agreement until
the default is cured.”242 Article VII.B of the JOA provided that each
party granted to the other party: “[A] lien upon any interest it now owns
or hereafter acquires in Oil and Gas leases and Oil and Gas Interests in
the Contract Area. . . . To secure performance of all its obligations under
this agreement including but not limited to payment of expense, interest,
and fees. . . .”243 Therefore, the nonoperator’s rights were suspended
under the JOA, the operator had a lien on nonoperator’s interests, and
foreclosure was an available remedy.244
The significance of the case is the strict and narrow construction of the
non-consent election and the clear distinction between a “non-consenting
party” who elected to go non-consent and a “defaulting” party who is
deemed to be a non-consenting party under common JOA provisions.
B. SEISMIC WELLS, LLC V. SINCLAIR OIL & GAS CO.
(ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER JOA)
Seismic Wells, LLC v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co.245 held that attorney’s
fees were not recoverable under the prevailing party provision of the
JOA.246 The JOA’s prevailing party provision stated: “In the event any
party is required to bring legal proceedings to enforce any financial obli-
gation of a party hereunder, the prevailing party in such action shall be
entitled to recover . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.”247 There were multi-
ple agreements between the parties, and Seismic (plaintiff) asserted many
claims against Sinclair (defendant). The plaintiff lost on all claims, and
the defendant sought to recover over $1 million in attorney’s fees as the
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 780 (quoting the JOA).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 782.
245. 750 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
246. Id. at 279.
247. Id. at 280.
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prevailing party under the JOA provision quoted above.248
In determining whether the defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees
under this specific provision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit looked critically at the language in the contract and the claims al-
leged by the plaintiff.249 The issue was whether the JOA’s prevailing
party provision applied in this case and, more specifically, whether the
plaintiff sought to enforce any financial obligation under the JOA.250
The Fifth Circuit examined the plaintiff’s claims and held that a major-
ity of them, such as fraud, “sought to void the agreements, not enforce
them.”251 The Fifth Circuit stated that because these claims “sought to
render the contracts unenforceable, they do not come within the scope of
the fee provision.”252
Count 6 and Count 12 of the petition alleged claims for breach of con-
tract as typically used to enforce contracts.253 However, both of those
counts pertained to alleged breaches of other agreements.254 The Fifth
Circuit then analyzed the word “hereunder” in the JOA prevailing party
provision.255 The Fifth Circuit found that “hereunder” is recognized as
meaning “this Contract.”256 Because the Fifth Circuit found that the al-
leged breaches were under other agreements and separate from the JOA,
and because the prevailing party provision of the JOA only applied to the
JOA, these counts could not be used to recover attorney’s fees.257
But, Count 12 also alleged a breach of the JOA, stating that the defen-
dant refused to assign operating rights and to reassign a well to the plain-
tiff.258 Here, unlike the other claims, the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiff
sought to enforce the JOA.259 However, the claim must also “seek[ ] to
enforce a ‘financial obligation.’”260 A financial obligation “requires some
nexus to a monetary or pecuniary obligation of the party.”261 Although
the plaintiff sought to recover monetary damages, it did not seek to en-
force a financial obligation.262 The Fifth Circuit also held that “[t]urning
over operatorship rights and running the well on [the plaintiff’s] pre-
ferred terms are not financial obligations.”263 Therefore, because none of
the plaintiff’s claims sought to enforce a financial obligation under the
248. Id.
249. See id. at 280–81.
250. Id. at 281.
251. Id.
252. Id. (emphasis in original).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d
650, 661 (Tex. 2009)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting In re WBH Energy, L.P., No. 15-10003-HM, 2016 WL 3049666, at
*12–13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 20, 2016)).
262. Id. at 282.
263. Id. (emphasis in original).
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JOA, the prevailing party provision did not apply, and the defendant was
not entitled to obtain attorney’s fees.264
The significance of the case is that it interprets a common form JOA
prevailing party provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees. The provi-
sion is strictly limited to claims asserted to enforce financial obligations
under the JOA (i.e., an obligation to pay, not a recovery for damages).
C. EAGLE OIL & GAS CO. V. SHALE EXPLORATION, LLC
(CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND TRADE SECRETS
AS TO PROSPECT)
Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Exploration, LLC265 held that a compila-
tion of ownership data within a prospect may constitute a trade secret,
and misappropriation of that data may result in a judgment for lost prof-
its.266 The operator developed a large prospect for drilling horizontal
shale wells in an area where ownership was highly fractionalized. There
were tens of thousands of mineral owners and the county records were
not available online.267 The operator had as many as 100 people working
on the prospect and compiled lease and leasing information for a year
with specialized software.268 The ultimate goal was to find a business
partner that would drill for oil or gas and flip the acreage to that
driller.269 The operator made a deal with Apache for Apache to take
300,000 or more acres at $800 per acre, and Apache purchased all of the
acres the operator was able to deliver.270
However, the operator also showed the prospect to other companies,
including the competitor. There was a confidentiality and non-competi-
tion agreement.271 The operator and the competitor had several lengthy
meetings, and the operator disclosed most of its information, including
the “treasure map,” which showed the open acreage in areas included in
the drilling units together with the lease schedule, and other maps distin-
guishing between open and leased lands.272 After the operator made its
deal with Apache, the competitor immediately formed a subsidiary under
an unrelated name to take title to leases in the county, and also formed a
leasing company under an unrelated name to conduct the leasing pro-
gram.273 There was no other competitor for leases in the county.274 The
competitor, without doing any title work, directed the leasing company to
acquire leases in the areas targeted by the operator and gave the leasing
264. Id.
265. 549 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. dism’d).
266. Id. at 263.
267. Id. at 264.
268. Id. at 270–71.
269. Id. at 264.
270. Id. at 265, 277.
271. Id. at 264.
272. Id. at 264–65.
273. Id. at 265.
274. Id. at 273.
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company the treasure map.275 The operator acquired far more than
300,000 acres for Apache,276 but the competitor acquired more than
11,000 leases in six weeks.277 The competitor was the operator’s only
competition in the county, and that competition caused the average bo-
nus to go up, and the operator was not able to acquire and sell the com-
petitor’s 11,000 leases to Apache.278
The operator sued the competitor for breach of contract and misappro-
priation of a trade secret.279 The jury found for the operator, and
awarded $14,300,000 for lost profits and $4,500,000 in exemplary dam-
ages.280 The operator had to choose its remedy between its contract or
tort claim,281 and judgment was entered on misappropriation of a trade
secret.282 On appeal, the principal issues were whether there was a trade
secret, the sufficiency of the evidence on lost profits, and the sufficiency
of the evidence on exemplary damages.
“[The operator] had to prove that it disclosed a trade secret to [the
competitor], in confidence, and that [the competitor] breached this confi-
dence and made unauthorized use of the secret.”283 “A compilation of
business information that provides a competitive advantage over those
who lack the compilation may constitute a trade secret.”284 Although
much of the information may have been derived from public sources, the
compilation may constitute a trade secret.285 The First Houston Court of
Appeals held the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s
implicit finding of a trade secret.286
To prove damages for lost profits, the operator relied upon expert testi-
mony to establish lost profits attributable to “(1) leases that it would have
acquired but for [the competitor’s] conduct; and (2) increased leasing
costs resulting from [the competitor’s] wrongful competition.”287 In sum-
mary, the operator’s expert calculated damages under (1) by subtracting
$250 per acre (the most the operator ever paid prior to the competitor’s
entry into the prospect) from $800 per acre (Apache’s price) for all of the
thirty-five leases within the prospect that the competitor obtained. The
result was $6 million in lost profits, and the jury awarded $4 million.288
The operator’s expert calculated damages under (2) as falling within a
275. Id. at 273–74.
276. Id. at 265.
277. Id. at 273.
278. Id. at 266, 275.
279. Id. at 265.
280. Id. at 263.
281. Id. at 269.
282. Id. at 266.
283. Id. at 269 (citing RSM Prod. Corp. v. Global Petrol. Grp., 507 S.W.3d 383, 393
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).
284. Id. at 270 (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.
1996)).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 272.
287. Id. at 266.
288. Id.
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range of $15 million to $25 million for lost profits. The operator’s expert
eliminated all of the leases the operator acquired for $300 per acre or less
as within the range of acquisition costs, absent the competition. As to the
926 leases acquired by the operator which cost more than $300 per acre,
the operator’s expert calculated the high end of the range by subtracting
$150 per acre (the operator’s initial standard offer) from the actual cost.
For the low end of the range, the operator’s expert subtracted $250 per
acre (the operator’s highest price paid prior to the competitor’s entry into
the prospect) from the actual cost. The range was $15 to $25 million, and
the jury awarded $10.3 million, for a total award of $14.3 million for lost
profits.289 The competitor’s expert effectively testified that the operator
suffered no lost profits.290
The court reviewed the evidence on damages for lost profits and found
the evidence to be legally sufficient.291 It was clearly important, and sim-
plified the necessary proof, that there was no other competition in the
prospect and Apache was ready to buy all of the leases the operator could
obtain.292 The competitor also challenged the judgment because the jury’s
award was less than the lower end of the range established by the opera-
tor’s expert. The court held that the jury’s finding was within the range of
the testimony, because the competitor’s own expert established the lower
end as zero, and the jury was not required to pick a number within the
range of the operator’s expert testimony.293
The court reversed the jury’s award of $4 million in exemplary dam-
ages.294 The operator “had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the lost profits it suffered resulted from malice,” and malice requires a
specific intent that the competitor intended to cause the operator a sub-
stantial injury.295 “[T]he intent to commit the tort alone cannot justify an
award of exemplary damages,” or every intentional tort would justify ex-
emplary damages.296 “Rather, the substantial injury [the competitor] in-
tended must be independent and qualitatively different from the
compensable harms associated with [the operator’s] claim for misappro-
priation of trade secrets. [The competitor’s] conduct also must have been
outrageous, malicious, or otherwise reprehensible.”297
The court held that there was no evidence of any harm other than the
competitor’s purchase of some of the leases and increased costs.298
Apache did not walk away, and drilling stopped only because the results
were poor.299 The dissent would affirm on exemplary damages because
289. Id. at 275–76.
290. Id. at 278.
291. See id. at 275–78.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 278.
294. Id. at 285.
295. Id. at 283.
296. Id.
297. Id. (citations omitted).
298. Id. at 284–85.
299. Id. at 285.
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there was some evidence that the competitor never drilled, never planned
to drill, but intended to position itself to break up prospective drilling
units, thus forcing additional negotiations and opportunities for the com-
petitor.300 The question was not whether the competitor succeeded, but
what it intended.301 Exemplary damages are not compensation for eco-
nomic loss, but a punishment, and the jury could award those damages
for deterrence and retribution.302
The opinion follows precedent that extensive compilations of land data
on a prospect may be a trade secret. It also offers guidance on presenting
expert testimony on damages for lost profits from misappropriation of
such a trade secret. Finally, it highlights the distinct elements of proof
required to support exemplary damages.
V. LITIGATION303
A. CARL M. ARCHER TRUST NO. THREE V. TREGELLAS (RIGHT OF
FIRST REFUSAL AND DISCOVERY RULE)
Carl M. Archer Trust No. Three v. Tregellas304 held that the discovery
rule applied to toll the statute of limitations on behalf of the holder of a
right of first refusal (ROFR) without notice of a sale subject to the
ROFR.305 The trustees of the Carl M. Archer Trust No. Three and the
Mary Frances G. Archer Trust No. 3 (Holders) were granted a ROFR to
purchase the mineral interest in a tract of land in Hansford County,
Texas.306 Four years after the ROFR was first granted, the mineral own-
ers conveyed the mineral interest in the tract at issue to Ronald Ralph
Tregellas and Donnita Tregellas (Purchasers) without first offering the
mineral interest to Holders.307
Holders did not learn of the conveyance to Purchasers until more than
four years later, and immediately filed suit against Purchasers.308 Pur-
chasers argued that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations be-
cause it was filed more than four years after the conveyance of the
300. Id. at 286–87 (Jennings, J., dissenting in part).
301. Id. at 288.
302. Id. (citing Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 873
(Tex. 2017)).
303. Other litigation cases in the reporting period include: MCG Drilling Invs., LLC v.
Double M Ranch, Ltd., No. 11-14-00299-CV, 2018 WL 2022590 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr.
30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trespass-to-try-title); Mellenbruch Family P’ship, L.P. v.
Kennemer, No. 04-17-00637-CV, 2018 WL 4096390 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (adverse possession of minerals in TTT); Seeligson v. Devon
Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 753 F. App’x 225 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (class action on duty
to market); Dorfman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 02-17-00387-CV, 2018 WL
5074769 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (colorable legal claim
to title as a defense); M&M Res., Inc. v. DSTJ, LLP, 564 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2018, no pet.) (trespass-to-try-title).
304. 566 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. 2018).
305. Id. at 292.
306. Id. at 284.
307. Id. at 285.
308. Id.
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mineral interest.309 Holders argued in part that the statute of limitations
should be tolled by the discovery rule, because Holders had no reason to
know that a conveyance had been granted four years prior.310
The trial court found that the statute of limitations did not bar the suit
by Holders, and that Holders were entitled to specific performance of the
ROFR.311 Purchasers appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed
the trial court and found that the statute of limitations began to run when
the mineral interests were conveyed, the discovery rule did not apply, and
the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.312 The sole issue before
the Texas Supreme Court was whether the discovery rule applied.
Generally, the statute of limitations for a matter “begins to run when
facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial rem-
edy.”313 Under this general rule, the statute of limitations for a breach of
contract action begins to run “the moment the contract is breached.”314
“Texas courts consistently hold, and [the supreme court agreed], that a
right of first refusal is breached when property is conveyed to a third
party without notice to the rightholder.”315 “Because [Holders] sued
more than four years after they were injured, the claim is time-barred
unless the accrual date is otherwise deferred.”316
“The discovery rule is a ‘limited exception’ to the general rule that a
cause of action accrues when a legal injury is incurred.”317 Under the
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue “until the plaintiff knew
or should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.”318
“[The supreme court] appl[ies] the discovery rule when the nature of the
injury is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objec-
tively verifiable.”319 That the injury was objectively verifiable was
undisputed.320
In order to determine whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of
limitations for the breach of the ROFR, the supreme court considered
whether the injury sustained by Holders was one “that could be discov-
ered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”321 An injury must be
undiscoverable during the limitations period for the discovery rule to ap-
ply, but the discovery rule is only applied categorically.322 Therefore, the
issue is not whether these particular Holders could have discovered the
309. Id. at 286.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 288 (quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,
221 (Tex. 2003)).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 290.
317. Id. (citing BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2011)).
318. Id. (citing S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)).
319. Id. (citing S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6).
320. Id.
321. Id. (citing Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 66).
322. Id.
264 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
injury.323
The supreme court held that the type of injury sustained by Holders
was undiscoverable because “a rightholder who has been given no notice
of the grantor’s intent to sell or the existence of a third-party offer gener-
ally has no reason to believe that his interest may have been im-
paired.”324 The supreme court noted that reasonable diligence on part of
the rightholder would not include “monitor[ing] public records for evi-
dence of such an impairment.”325
Therefore, the supreme court concluded:
We therefore hold that a grantor’s conveyance of property in breach
of a right of first refusal, where the rightholder is given no notice of
the grantor’s intent to sell or the purchase offer, is inherently undis-
coverable and that the discovery rule applies to defer accrual of the
holder’s cause of action until he knew or should have known of the
injury.326
By footnote, the supreme court also said the following: “We limit our
holding to this particular breach—conveyance with no notice of the intent
to sell or the existence of an offer—of this particular type of right.”327 In
this case, Purchasers “were not bona fide purchasers for value,” but pur-
chased with notice, and Purchasers were subject to judgment for specific
performance under the ROFR.328
The significance of this case is that the holder of a ROFR for a mineral
interest is not required to monitor property records for an impairment of
the ROFR to preserve the right to sue for a breach of the ROFR.
B. LACKEY V. TEMPLETON (TRESPASS-TO-TRY-TITLE)
Lackey v. Templeton329 reversed and rendered a summary judgment
for the appellees because the appellees failed to plead a trespass-to-try-
title action.330 This case involved many parties, and numerous claims and
motions, including motions for partial summary judgment generally based
on claims of superior title. The appellees sought relief under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act (DJA). The appellants filed special exceptions and
contended that the appellees must replead their case as a trespass-to-try-
title action. The trial court denied the special exceptions and granted par-
tial motions for summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The issue
before the Beaumont Court of Appeals was whether the appellees should
have pled a trespass-to-try-title action, instead of an action under the
323. Id.
324. Id. at 292.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 292 n.10 (emphasis in original).
328. Id. at 286.
329. No. 09-17-00183-CV, 2018 WL 3384570 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 12, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
330. Id. at *1.
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The DJA provides that:
[A] person interested under a deed . . . or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a . . . contract . . . may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other
legal relations thereunder.332
A declaratory judgment action allows “parties to seek a declaration of
rights under certain instruments.”333 The DJA has different pleading and
proof requirements than a trespass-to-try-title action, which is found in
the Texas Property Code (TPC). The TPC “states that a trespass to try
title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, and
other real property,”334 and it has been held that it “is the exclusive rem-
edy by which to resolve competing claims to property.”335 “To prevail in a
trespass-to-try-title action, a plaintiff must usually (1) prove a regular
chain of conveyances from the sovereign, (2) establish superior title out
of a common source, (3) prove title by limitations, or (4) prove title by
prior possession coupled with proof that possession was not aban-
doned.”336 “A dispute involving a claim of superior title must be brought
as a trespass-to-try-title action.”337
The appellants timely filed special exceptions in the trial court, which
should have been granted, and therefore the court of appeals reversed
and rendered on the declaratory judgment without prejudice to any pend-
ing trespass-to-try-title claims.338 There are examples in other opinions
where cases were tried as a declaratory judgment proceeding without
timely objection, and then, on appeal, the courts have struggled to fit the
pleadings and trial within the requirements of trespass-to-try-title to
avoid a second trial. This case is a clear example of a timely objection in
the trial court against proceeding outside the confines of the pleading and
proof required in trespass-to-try-title. “[T]he fact that the DJA might oth-
erwise cover their claims does not mean that the claims may be brought
under the DJA if they must be brought as trespass-to-try-title actions.”339
Essentially, “[a] dispute involving a claim of superior title must be
brought as a trespass-to-try-title action.”340
This case clearly should have been tried in trespass-to-try-title and il-
lustrates the proper procedure for objecting in the trial court and preserv-
331. Id. at *1–4.
332. Id. at *5 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a)).
333. Id. (quoting Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004)).
334. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)).
335. Id. (citing Lile v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.)).
336. Id. (quoting Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265).
337. Id. (citing Coinmatch Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 926
(Tex. 2013)).
338. Id. at *6.
339. Id. (citing Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 267; Jinkins v. Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d 771, 786 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)).
340. Id. at *5 (citing Coinmatch, 417 S.W.3d at 926).
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ing error by filing special exceptions. It also illustrates that the improper
declaratory judgment will be reversed and rendered. Under some facts,
there may be limitations issues triggered by a failure to timely file and
plead in trespass to try title.
VI. REGULATION341
A. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS V. POLK OPERATING, LLC
(JURISDICTION ON APPEAL)
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Polk Operating, LLC342 held that the
district court in Austin had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from TRC or-
ders that failed to grant all of the relief requested.343 Polk Operating,
LLC (Polk) operated an oil and gas waste facility licensed by the TRC.
The TRC brought an enforcement action against Polk involving inade-
quately lined and over capacity storage pits. Evergreen Underground
Water Conservation District intervened. According to Polk, the interven-
tion was urged on by Polk’s competitor. Evergreen “sought discovery re-
garding the identity of Polk’s customers, Polk’s compensation
arrangements, and Polk’s activities on the property adjacent to its re-
cycling facility.”344
Polk objected to the discovery request, and after an administrative law
judge (ALJ) entered a protective order, but granted discovery, Polk
asked the TRC to reverse the ALJ’s interim orders and to “fashion a
more comprehensive protective order” to prevent the release of trade
secrets.345 The TRC responded by strengthening the protective order, but
did not reverse the discovery request.346 When Polk responded by filing
for a writ of mandamus and writ of injunction in the Austin district court,
the TRC argued “that Polk failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
at the agency level” and that the TRC had jurisdiction.347 The district
court denied the TRC’s plea to the jurisdiction, and an interlocutory ap-
peal to the Austin Court of Appeals followed.348 The issues were whether
Polk exhausted the administrative remedies available to it at the TRC,
and whether Polk had “standing to challenge the discovery orders be-
cause [Polk] was successful in its appeal to the [TRC].”349
The TRC argued that “Polk’s appeal to the [TRC] did not explicitly
reference the ALJ’s failure to make a necessity finding regarding Polk’s
341. The other regulation case in the reporting period was Armour Pipe Line Co. v.
Sandel Energy, Inc., 546 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)
(authority to do business).
342. No. 03-17-00080-CV, 2018 WL 1004567 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
343. Id. at *1.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at *2.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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trade-secret objections” and that because the TRC did strengthen the
protective order Polk lacked standing because “Polk’s appeal to the
[TRC] was successful.”350
In determining whether Polk had exhausted its remedies with the TRC,
the court reasoned that failure to “invoke the trade-secret necessity issue
. . . would constitute a waiver of the necessity issue, not a failure of juris-
diction.”351 “Thus, the adequacy or sufficiency of Polk’s appeal of the in-
terim orders of the [TRC] does not affect the district court’s jurisdiction
here.”352
In regard to the standing issue, the court reasoned that the TRC had
not granted all of the relief requested.353 “The [TRC] . . . did strengthen
the protective order as requested . . . , [but] did not reverse the discovery
orders . . . .”354 “Thus, Polk did not receive all of its requested relief.”355
The case followed existing precedent that the filing of a motion for
rehearing is jurisdictional, but the sufficiency of that motion is not. On its
face, the TRC did not grant all the relief requested.
VII. CONCLUSION
Frequently, title and conveyancing cases turn on document construc-
tion, and an opinion may be more or less important, depending upon how
frequently similar language is used in the industry. Opinions that reach
fundamental concepts of title are likely to be much more significant in the
evolution of jurisprudence related to oil, gas, and mineral law. In Co-
nocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann,356 the Texas Supreme Court carved out a
unique exception to the rule against perpetuities limited to the oil and gas
context. It is likely that this limitation on the Rule will have broad appli-
cation, because property rights in the industry are frequently derived
from oil and gas leases. Oil and gas leases almost always create a fee
simple determinable interest (the term of the lease is for a term of years
and for so long thereafter as oil, gas, or other mineral is produced in
paying quantities) in the lessee, with the possibility of reverter in the les-
sor. Creating additional rights after lease termination is common, and this
case broadly holds that the termination of an oil and gas lease is certain,
that defeasible term interests in minerals promote the public policy of
alienability of land, and the artificial construct of a twenty-one-year win-
dow will not be used as the test for an illegal restraint.
If Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.357 stands up upon review, the hold-
ing (that an overriding royalty cannot attach to a new lease under an anti-
washout clause because it violates the rule against perpetuities) will be
350. Id.
351. Id. at *3.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018).
357. 557 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. filed).
268 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
very significant. As between “extensions,” “renewals,” and “new” leases,
the most common fact pattern is “new” leases. Koopmann was not con-
sidered in Yowell, but Yowell has the additional uncertainty of whether
or not there actually will be a new lease, and there is no time limit in
Yowell for the acquisition of that lease. However, in Yowell, the holder of
the interest is ascertainable and the preceding estate is certain to
terminate.
Although much of the opinion in Perryman v. Spartan Texas Six Capi-
tal Partners, Ltd.358 is focused on parsing the language of a specific deed,
the more lasting significance is the Texas Supreme Court’s emphasis on
limiting the Duhig doctrine to reservations without implications for ex-
ceptions. An excepted interest, regardless of who owns it, is simply not
conveyed to grantee.
Many, perhaps most, deed construction cases in Texas arise in the con-
text of oil and gas interests, because that is where the money is. Generic
rules of deed construction have a significant impact on the ownership of
minerals. For perhaps a hundred years, the trend of the cases was driven
by canons of construction, which were broadly conceived as rules to re-
solve uncertainty in deed construction. The hope was that the canons
would bring greater certainty to uncertain deeds, reducing the need to
resort to litigation. Eventually, there was a canon to support any conclu-
sion desired. For about twenty or thirty years, the Texas Supreme Court
has been moving away from canons or rules toward a more holistic ap-
proach of divining the parties’ intent from the words used within the doc-
ument and harmonizing the entire document.359 United States Shale
Energy II, LLC v. Laborde Properties, L.P.360 is particularly useful in
summarizing this holistic, plain meaning approach to deed construction.
It appears to elevate the importance of grammar and punctuation over
precedent, although precedent has been one of the most important tools
for the lawyer seeking certainty. Oddly, it also comes at a time when the
world is moving toward reducing all communications to 140 characters. It
will be interesting to see the first case turning on the meaning of an emoji
in a text. The split opinion in this case illustrates the tension between
determining intent from the document, and construing the document
based on what the parties “must have” intended.
The interests of the lessor and lessee under an oil and gas lease are
generally aligned on wanting the maximum production at the best price
as soon as possible. However, because the lessor generally gets a free ride
on the path to reaching those goals, it is not surprising that the lessor and
lessee are frequently in conflict on the details of the lessee’s performance.
For lessors, it has always been a source of concern that the lessee is taking
too long and holding too much acreage for too little effort. Some version
of a retained acreage clause is now common in oil and gas leases. How-
358. 546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018).
359. See, e.g., Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 792 (Tex. 2017).
360. 551 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. 2018).
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ever phrased, such clauses have the general effect of limiting the time and
the acreage that the lessee can hold. The interests of the lessor and lessee
are not aligned on such a clause, which always favors the lessor. A com-
mon way to settle on the terms of the clause is to find as much common
ground as possible. Both parties want to produce as much as possible out
of a single well, so any restrictions on the lessee should not extend to
limiting the allowable production from a well. Therefore, it is quite com-
mon for retained acreage clauses to be tied to the regulations bearing on
production—allowables and acreage assigned to wells for purposes of de-
termining the right to produce and allowables. Because the regulatory
scheme functions as government policy, and is separate from any private
party’s particular objective, it also has some moral high ground as regard-
ing fairness.
Because the parties have no control over the regulatory universe, in-
corporating regulatory matters into a private contract is not without risk.
The companion cases of XOG Operating, LLC v. Chesapeake Explora-
tion Ltd. Partnership361 and Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Discov-
ery Operating, Inc.362 are intended to definitively resolve the differences
in common retained acreage clauses which either refer to acreage “as-
signed” or “prescribed” for purposes of allowable and proration units. In
summary, the Texas Supreme Court says that parties are free to contract
by including such terms in their leases, but the results may be significantly
different and turn upon the usage of such terms in the regulatory
universe.
In Murphy Exploration & Production Co.-USA v. Adams,363 the Texas
Supreme Court held that an implied proximity requirement may be a
“reasonable premise in the context of vertical drilling, where placement
of an offset well is an important factor in minimizing the amount of oil or
gas being drained,” but the “same principle does not apply in the context
of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.”364 This statement may be
an important precursor for opinions to come. With the dramatic shift of
the industry away from vertical wells to horizontal wells, oil and gas juris-
prudence has been left far behind. There has been surprisingly little litiga-
tion, but there is a sense that an explosion is coming. Issues involving
allocation wells, trespass, pooling, implied lease covenants, implied lease
easements, payment of royalty, retained acreage clauses, surface rights,
and the accommodation doctrine all seem to be ripe for challenge and
redefinition.
Devon Energy Production Co., v. Apache Corp.365 recognizes the duty
the lessee owes to the lessor to pay royalty under the lease, but refuses to
find an extension of that duty under the division order statute. Operators
361. 554 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. 2018).
362. 554 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2018).
363. 560 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2018).
364. Id. at 112.
365. 550 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied).
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and nonoperators may continue to shuffle that duty between them, or
among them, if a third party “payor” is included. However, the duty to
pay is the lessee’s duty, and the lessor’s recourse will be against the les-
sor’s lessee. Although Koopmann is discussed above under title and con-
veyancing cases, it also appears to have a significant impact on payment
of royalty under the division order statute. When the statute was enacted,
it was viewed as a compromise between lessors and lessees. Lessors
wanted an obligation imposed upon lessees to timely pay royalty. Lessees
were willing to accept the statutory obligation to timely pay, but only
because there was a statutory right to suspend, primarily for title issues.
Koopmann suggests the lessees got nothing in the trade.
Most production is governed by some form of operating agreement,
and most operating agreements are based on some version of the AAPL
Form 610 Operating Agreement. Thus, any decision construing such an
agreement is likely to have extensive and continuing importance. While
the draftsmen of those form agreements are concerned with protecting
the interests of the nonoperators, it is fundamental to the concept of the
operating agreement that one party has to step up and assume the role of
the operator for the benefit and interest of all in the joint operations. It is
of great importance to protect the operator, who is effectively assuming
risk for all, against the defaulting nonoperator. In Allen Drilling Acquisi-
tion Co. v. Crimson Exploration, Inc.,366 the Waco Court of Appeals
strongly puts the hammer on the defaulting nonoperator who fails to pay.
Many operating agreements include advance payments to lower the oper-
ator’s risk, but the granting of a lien and a possible foreclosure has long
been perceived as an important protection for the operator.
Similarly, Seismic Wells, LLC v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co.367 enforces the
right to recover attorneys’ fees on a financial obligation under the operat-
ing agreement. Such a claim is most likely to originate with the operator
as plaintiff. Recovery of fees on most other claims is left to applicable law
in the applicable jurisdiction.
In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court has acted to severely limit
the application of the discovery rule, which was invoked by the litigants in
almost every case involving a statute of limitations.368 One of the tools
employed by the supreme court to limit such contests was to impose the
requirement that the discovery rule would only be applied categorically.
That is, there is not a contest in every case to determine if a specific liti-
gant should have known of the accrual of the cause of action. Rather, the
availability or not of the discovery rule is determined categorically by the
kind of case before the court. The supreme court has generally rejected
the application of the discovery rule, and in the context of oil and gas
cases, has found that publicly available documents (such as documents at
366. 558 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. filed).
367. 750 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2018).
368. See, e.g., ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch L.P., 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017).
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the TRC) make the discovery rule inapplicable.369 However, in Carl M.
Archer Trust No. Three v. Tregellas,370 the supreme court refused to im-
pose a duty on the holder of a ROFR to continually check the deed
records to determine if the ROFR had been breached. The holding seems
to be consistent with the general rule that property owners, while bound
by the previous record title, are not bound by subsequent changes in re-
cord title.
In 2004, the Texas Supreme Court reasserted that the trespass-to-try-
title statute provides “the method for determining title to . . . real prop-
erty.”371 Since 2004, there have been two or three cases every year in
which the litigants are disputing whether they can try a title case by some
other proceeding, usually under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Lackey v.
Templeton372 is an example for this reporting period. It highlights the
proper challenge to pleadings other than trespass-to-try-title. Special ex-
ceptions should be made in the trial court, and if not granted, on appeal a
judgment will be reversed and rendered.
After twenty-three years of commenting on Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law
for the SMU Annual Texas Survey, this is my final contribution. The ma-
jestic evolution and refinement of our jurisprudence has been, and will
continue to be, an amazing testament to the efficacy of the rule of law.
369. See, e.g., BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 68–69 (Tex. 2011).
370. 566 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. 2018).
371. Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. 22.001(a)).
372. No. 09-17-00183-cv, 2018 WL 3384570 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 12, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
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